In four experiments, the predictions made by causal-model theory and the Rescorla-Wagner model are tested by using a cue-interaction paradigm that measures the relative response to a given event based on the influence or salience of an alternative event. Experiments 1 and 2 uncorrelate two variables that have typically been confounded in the literature (causal order and the number of cues and outcomes) and demonstrate that overall contingency judgments are influenced by the causal structure of the events. Experiment 3 shows that trial-by-trial prediction responses, a second measure of causal assessment, are not influenced by the causal structure of the described events. Experiment 4 revealed that participants became less sensitive to the influence of the causal structure in both their ratings and their predictions as trials progressed. Thus, two experiments provide evidence for high-level (causal reasoning) processes, and two experiments provide evidence for low-level (associative) processes. We argue that both factors influence causal assessment depending on what is being asked about the events, and participants' experience with those events.
In the past decade, the debate between causal-model and associative learning theorists has centered on whether or not human inferences are sensitive to the causal structure of contingent events (see Waldmann, 2000, for review) . While causal models code events in terms of causes and effects, associative models disregard the causal description of the events, instead coding them solely in terms of their temporal order in which antecedent events are referred to as cues and subsequent events as outcomes. The disagreement has been with regard to the nature of the processes involved in making causal inferences. According to causal-model theory, expectations of causal structure guide learning about the relevant causal events in a top-down fashion. In contrast, an associative account maintains that causal learning is modelled by the bottom-up acquisition of associative weights guided by simple event pairings. This article examines the extent and circumstances in which these two factors influence causal assessments and describes the conditions under which they operate.
As researchers started applying the principles of associative learning theories to humans (e.g., Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) , Waldmann and Holyoak (1992) argued that humans
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are capable of more sophisticated forms of causal learning than simply reacting to contingencies in their environment. They argued that people conceptualise the asymmetry of causal relationships. Causes influence effects, but effects do not influence causes. "In addition to using perceived or imagined causes to predict future events, people can use perceived or imagined effects as cues to diagnose their unseen causes." (Waldmann & Holyoak, 1997, p. 125) . Our knowledge of causal asymmetry provides us with the capacity to ignore the order that events are presented thereby transforming them into causal-model representations that reflect their asymmetry (Waldmann, 2000) . The Rescorla-Wagner model (which embodies the essential and salient characteristics of associative models) neglects the causal status among events by simply encoding their temporal order. Events that occur first are encoded as cues, and subsequent events are encoded as outcomes. It follows from causal-model theory that causes interact and effects do not. That is, we judge one cause in light of another, but judge two effects independently. According to the Rescorla-Wagner model, cues compete and outcomes do not. The term cue-interaction refers broadly to the relative assessment of two events without reference to the mechanism of interaction.
Causal-model and associative theories have often been pitted against one another in the context of cue-interaction paradigms such as blocking (e.g., Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992; Waldmann, 2000) , relative cue validity (e.g., Van Hamme, Kao, & Wasserman, 1993; Matute, Arcediano, & Miller, 1996) , and overshadowing (e.g., Waldmann, 2001) . Of interest in each of these paradigms is the extent to which participants regard one cue in light of another, or consider each cue independently. In the present series of experiments, the one-phase simultaneous blocking task (Baker, Mercier, Vallée-Tourangeau, Frank, & Pan, 1993 ) was used to pro-vide a novel test of causal-model theory by means of the conditional ∆P account (Spellman, 1996a (Spellman, , 1996b . According to causal-model theory, when two causes produce one effect, one should consider each cause conditional upon the other because causes interact. When one cause produces two effects, one should consider each effect independent of the other because effects do not interact. The one-phase simultaneous blocking design enables the use of two differentially predictive causes in which the participant is free to conditionalize on one another thereby providing an strong test of the model's predictions. When two causes produce one effect, a conditional ∆P account applied to causal-model theory predicts that participants should rate the influence of each cause in accordance with conditional ∆P. When one cause produces two effects participants should rate the influence of the cause on each effect in accordance with unconditional ∆P.
In a task involving two cues and a single outcome, one of four cue combinations are possible on a given trial: both cues may be present (AB), one cue may be present and the other absent (A∼B or ∼AB), or both cues may be absent (∼A∼B). For each cue combination, the outcome either occurs (O) or does not occur (∼O) resulting in eight possible cue-outcome combinations as illustrated in Figure 1 . Thus, each cue can be expressed in terms of its respective unconditional ∆P value defined as:
(1)
where each equation corresponds to the difference between the proportion of times the outcome occurs given the cue and the proportion of times the outcome occurs not given the cue (Allan, 1980) . Alternatively, Cues A and B can be expressed in terms of their respective conditional ∆P values defined as:
The conditional ∆P values in Equations 3 -6 allow one to assess the influence of each cue both in the presence and absence of the other cue. For example, to assess the influence of Cue A, Equation 3 describes only the cases in which Cue B is present by taking the difference between the proportion of times the outcome occurs given A and the proportion of times the outcome occurs not given A. Moreover, Equation 4 describes only the cases in which Cue B is absent by taking the difference between the proportion of times the outcome occurs given A and the proportion of times the outcome occurs not given A. Therefore, when two causes produce one effect, a conditional ∆P account applied to causal-model theory predicts that, because each cause should be assessed in light of the other, participants should rate the influence of each cause in accordance with conditional ∆P (Equations 3 -6). When one cause produces two effects, because each effect should be assessed independently, participants should rate the influence of the cause on each effect in accordance with unconditional ∆P (Equations 1 and 2). Under these circumstances, with only one cause and two effects, one must rotate the 4×2 contingency matrix shown in Figure 1 to form a 2×4 matrix in which the two rows represent the presence and absence of the cause, and the columns represent the four combinations of the two effects. By doing so, it is impossible to calculate the conditional contingencies for A and B defined in Equations 3 -6. Experiments designed to test causal-model theory have typically compared two causal scenarios in which two (or more) causes precede a single effect or in which two (or more) effects precede a single cause thereby confounding causal order (CE vs. EC) and the number of causes and effects (2-1 vs. 1-2) (e.g., Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992; Matute et al., 1996; Waldmann, 2000) . As illustrated in Figure 2 , four cause-effect scenarios are possible by crossing the two variables: two cues can be followed by one outcome and be described as two causes producing an effect (2C-1E) or as two effects resulting from a cause (2E-1C), and one cue can be followed by two outcomes and be described as a cause producing two effects (1C-2E) or as an effect resulting from two causes (1E-2C). According to causal-model theory, participants should be sensitive to the interaction between causal order and the number of the causes and effects which is defined as the structure of the causal relationship (Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992 , 1997 Waldmann, 2000 Waldmann, , 2001 . The model predicts that pairs of causes will interact in the 2C-1E and 1E-2C scenarios (i.e., the negative diagonal of Figure 2 ) and predicts that pairs of effects will not interact in the 2E-1C and 1C-2E scenarios (i.e., the positive diagonal of Figure 2 ). In contrast, according to the Rescorla-Wagner model, participants should be sensitive only to the number of the cues and outcomes in which cues interact regardless of their causal order. The model therefore predicts that pairs of cues will interact in the 2C-1E and 2E-1C scenarios (i.e., the left column of Figure 2 ) and predicts that pairs of outcomes will not interact in the 1C-2E and 1E-2C scenarios (i.e., the right column of Figure 2 ).
To summarize, a conditional ∆P account applied to causalmodel theory predicts that judgments of a pair of differentially predictive causes should elicit a cue-interaction effect, while judgments of a pair of differentially diagnostic effects should not. In contrast, the Rescorla-Wagner model predicts that judgments of a pair of differentially contingent cues should elicit a cue-interaction effect, while judgments of a pair of differentially contingent outcomes should not.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to test the predictions made by causal-model theory and the Rescorla-Wagner model by independently manipulating causal order and the number of cues and outcomes. Thus, four causal scenarios were presented to participants using the one-phase simultaneous blocking task described above. Two cues were described either as causes of an effect (2C-1E) or as effects of a cause (2E-1C); or one cue was described either as a cause of two effects (1C-2E) or as an effect of two causes (1E-2C) as shown in Figure 2 . In each of the four scenarios, the two events that were presented simultaneously were either differentially predictive or diagnostic of the single event. Event A had a moderately positive unconditional ∆P of 0.5, and was paired with B which had an unconditional ∆P of 0 or 1. Causalmodel theory predicts that participants will demonstrate a cue-interaction effect in the 2C-1E and 1E-2C scenarios (and not in the other two), and the Rescorla-Wagner model predicts that participants will demonstrate a cue-interaction effect in the 2C-1E and 2E-1C scenarios (and not in the other two).
Method

Participants and Design
Forty-eight undergraduate students at McMaster University participated for course credit. The experiment was de- signed to test how ratings of a moderately positive contingency varied in the presence of a zero or a perfect contingency as a function of causal order and the number of cues and outcomes. A four-factor mixed design was used with causal order as a between factor with two levels (CE and EC); and the number of cues and outcomes as a within factor with two levels (2-1 and 1-2). Thus, half of the participants were assigned to the CE group and presented with the 2C-1E and 1C-2E scenarios, and half were assigned to the EC group and received the 2E-1C and 1E-2C scenarios. Within each group, the order that the scenarios were presented was counterbalanced. A third within factor was the contingency of Event B (∆P B = 0 and ∆P B = 1), in which the order of presentation was also counterbalanced. The fourth factor was a within factor representing the number of trials prior to the participants' ratings (32 and 48). Table 1 illustrates the trial frequencies obtained by combining an unconditional contingency for A (∆P A = 0.5) with one of two unconditional contingencies for B: a zero contingency (∆P B = 0) or a perfect contingency (∆P B = 1). We use the notation introduced by Baker et al. (1993) to represent the unconditional contingencies of the two events, ∆P A /∆P B . The designation for the two examples in Table 1 are 0.5/0 and 0.5/1, in which the value on the left of the solidus represents ∆P A and the value on the right represents ∆P B .
Procedure and Materials
The design and procedure for Experiment 1 were adapted from Mehta (2000) . Participants received instructions on a computer screen where they were informed about four strains of bacteria that have been discovered in the mammalian digestive system. In the 2C-1E and 1E-2C scenarios, they were told that scientists were testing whether a pair of chemicals affected the strain's survival, whereas, in the 2E-1C and 1C-2E scenarios, the scientists were testing whether the bacteria affected the production of a pair of chemicals.
Up to four participants at a time performed the experiment on Power Macintosh computers located in separate rooms. The entire experiment was programmed in MetaCard 2.3.1. In the instructions, the four causal scenarios were identified as separate "experiments" designed to test the influence of the chemicals on the bacterial strain, or vice versa. Within each scenario, forty-eight trials were presented in random order according to the frequencies presented in Table 1 . The addition or production of a chemical was indicated by a computer rendered movie of a colored three-dimensional chemical spinning along its axis, and actual footage of moving bacteria was displayed when the bacterial strain survived or was added. Faded, unmoving greyscale images of the same chemicals and bacteria were displayed to indicate their absence on a given trial. The names of the chemicals and bacteria were displayed only when the events occurred. Each of the movies and images were randomly assigned fictitious names from a set of eight chemicals and four bacteria. Chemical A was always presented on the left hand side of the display, and Chemical B was always presented on the right. The observer initiated a condition by clicking the "Begin" button on the computer screen and initiated each subsequent trial by clicking the "Next Trial" button.
The materials for the four causal scenarios are described as follows:
2C-1E: Participants were instructed that each of the two chemicals would either be added to the bacterial strain or not, resulting in the survival or death of the bacterial strain. They were then presented with a series of trials in which one, both, or neither chemical was added, followed by the survival or death of the bacterial strain.
1C-2E: Participants were instructed that the bacterial strain would either be added to a human digestive environment or not, resulting in the production of each of a pair chemicals or not. They were then presented with a series of trials in which the bacterial strain was either added or not, followed by the production of one, both, or neither chemical.
2E-1C:
Participants were instructed that the bacterial strain would either be added to a human digestive environment or not, resulting in the production of each of a pair chemicals or not. They were then presented with a series of trials in which one, both, or neither chemical was produced, followed by the addition of the bacterial strain or not.
1E-2C: Participants were instructed that each of the two chemicals would either be added to the bacterial strain or not, resulting in the survival or death of the bacterial strain. They were then presented with a series of trials in which the bacterial strain survived or not, followed by the addition of one, both, or neither chemical.
After passively viewing a series of thirty-two trials, participants in the 2C-1E and 1E-2C scenarios were asked to rate how strongly each chemical affected the survival of the bacteria, and those in the 2E-1C and 1C-2E scenarios were asked to rate how strongly the bacteria affected the production of each chemical. Ratings were made on a scale ranging from -100 to 100 by moving a horizontal scrollbar with a mouse ranging from -100 at the leftmost position to 100 at the rightmost position, anchored at 0 at the center. After rating A, they were prompted to rate B, followed by another sixteen trials in which they would repeat the rating process. After observing two "experiments" in which ∆P B was either 0 or 1, a second set of instructions was presented, nearly identical to the first differing only in the number of cues and outcomes as described previously. Again, ∆P B was either 0 or 1 for the latter two "experiments" comprising a total of four conditions.
Results and Discussion
Mean ratings of Event A after 48 trials are illustrated in Figure 3a (error-bars represent standard errors of the means). Ratings for each of the four scenarios are plotted as a function of the two ∆P B values. According to causal-model theory, when two causes produce a single effect (2C-1E and 1E-2C) ratings of A, which was always moderately positive, should remain moderately positive in the presence of a zero contingency and should be much less positive in the presence of a perfect contingency (tracking the conditional ∆P values in Table 1 ). When two effects result from a single cause (2E-1C and 1C-2E), A should be rated as moderately positive both in the presence of a zero or perfect contingency (tracking the unconditional ∆P values in Table 1 ). According to the Rescorla-Wagner model, cue-interaction should be present only in the 2C-1E and 2E-1C scenarios. The pattern of results presented in Figure 3a are consistent with causal-model theory. Only in the 2C-1E and 1E-2C scenarios are ratings of the moderately positive contingency noticeably lower in the presence of a perfect contingency (∆P B = 1) than in the presence of a zero contingency (∆P B = 0). Although "noticeably lower" here refers to a sizeable negative rating of A, what is relevant is that the trend in participants' ratings of A demonstrate conditionalization (see also Spellman, 1996a) .
A four-way mixed ANOVA (effects were assessed for significance at the α = .05 level), with ratings of A as the dependent variable, revealed significant main effects of contingency for Event B (∆P B = 0 vs. ∆P B = 1), F(1, 46) = 40.12, MSe = 3112.23, and the number of cues and outcomes (2-1 vs. 1-2), F(1, 46) = 4.55, MSe = 1388.45. The trial main effect (rating after 32 vs. 48 trials) was not significant, F(1, 46) = .28, MSe = 609.23, nor did it interact with any of the other factors. The main effect of causal order (CE vs. EC), while not significant, F(1, 46) = .04, MSe = 2573.04, did interact with the number of cues and outcomes and the contingency for Event B, F(1, 46) = 17.78, MSe = 2635.78. This significant three-way interaction was further examined using the Tukey test. When ∆P B = 0, the ratings were not significantly different among the four scenarios. Moreover, these ratings did not differ from the ratings in the two scenarios in which one cause produced two effects (1C-2E and 2E-1C) when ∆P B = 1. In contrast, ratings in the two scenarios in which two causes produced one effect (2C-1E and 1E-2C) when ∆P B = 1 were significantly lower than the other ratings and did not differ from each other.
Mean ratings of Event B are shown in Figure 3b . Table 1 indicates that for both 0.5/0 and 0.5/1, the conditional probabilities are the same as the unconditional probabilities. Therefore, ratings of B should be the same for the four scenarios, and should be lower for 0.5/0 than for 0.5/1. It is clear from Figure 3b that the ratings for B are consistent with causal-model theory. With ratings of Event B as the dependent variable, a four-way ANOVA revealed that the only main effect that was significant was ∆P B , F(1, 46) = 628.13, MSe = 1394.64. None of the interactions involving ∆P B were significant confirming that ratings for a constant ∆P B did not differ across causal order or number of cue and outcomes. The only other significant outcome was the interaction between causal order and trial, F(1, 46) = 4.14, MSe = 474.94. The Tukey test revealed that this interaction reflected higher ratings for the CE order than for the EC order after 32 trials but not after 48 trials.
In summary, Experiment 1 resulted in a significant interaction between causal order and the number of cues and outcomes. When two causes resulted in a one effect (2C-1E and 1E-2C), participants rated the moderately contingent Cause A as less predictive when it was paired with a perfect predictor (∆P B = 1) than when it was paired with a nonpredictor (∆P B = 0). When one cause resulted in two effects (2E-1C and 1C-2E), participants rated the moderately contingent Effect A as equally diagnostic, both when the effect it had been paired with was perfectly diagnostic (∆P B = 1) or was non-diagnostic (∆P B = 0). These results indicate that cue-interaction occurs when two causes produce a one effect regardless of whether the causes are presented before or after the effect, thus providing clear support for causal-model theory. Participants' overall ratings seem to be sensitive to the causal structure of contingent events.
Both causal-model theory and the Rescorla-Wagner model predict a cue-interaction effect when two causes precede a single effect (2C-1E) and no cue-interaction when one cause precedes two effects (1C-2E). However, only causalmodel theory predicts the pattern of results obtained in Experiment 1 in which a cue-interaction effect occurs when one effect precedes two causes (1E-2C) and no cue-interaction occurs when two effects precede one cause (2E-1C). Notice, however, that ratings of A in the presence of a perfect predictor are lower in the 2E-1C scenario compared to the 1C-2E scenario. Similarly, ratings of A in the presence of a perfect predictor are lower in the 2C-1E scenario compared to the 1E-2C scenario. According to causal-model theory, when two effects precede a single cause (2E-1C), there should be no difference between ratings of A when B is perfectly predictive or non-predictive and these ratings should not differ from the 1C-2E scenario. In contrast, when one effect precedes two causes (1E-2C), there should be a difference between ratings of A when B is perfectly predictive or nonpredictive and these ratings should not differ from the 2C-1E scenario. The data indicate, however, that when the effects come first, the influence of the causal model seems to lessen, or perhaps, the influence of an associative mechanism may increase. We will revisit this point in the discussion of Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
The data provided in Experiment 1 indicate that participants' overall ratings are sensitive to the causal structure of the events. Following the suggestion that causal order and the number of cues and outcomes had been confounded in previous investigations of cue-interaction, four causal scenarios were tested in Experiment 1 in which a moderately positive contingency (∆P A = 0.5) was paired either with a zero contingency (∆P B = 0) or a perfect contingency (∆P B = 1). Experiment 2 was designed to replicate the results from Experiment 1 and to generalize from the extreme contingencies used to less extreme values by including three intermediate ∆P B values (0.25, 0.5, 0.75). The ∆P B values chosen for the three intermediate contingency pairs were selected to best contrast the predictions made by the Rescorla-Wagner model and causal-model theory through participants' ratings of A, and were not chosen for their intrinsic value. To clarify, several different frequencies can be selected to fill the eight cells of the 4×2 matrix each resulting in various combinations of unconditional and conditional ∆P values. The frequencies for Experiment 2 (shown in Table 2 ) were selected to produce Spellman, 1996b, Property 4) . In addition, Experiment 2 was designed to independently test each of the four causal scenarios. In Experiment 1, half of the participants were presented with both the 2C-1E and 1C-2E scenarios and the other half were presented with the 2E-1C and 1E-2C scenarios. In Experiment 2, however, each group was presented with only one causal scenario (2C-1E, 2E-1C, 1C-2E, or 1E-2E).
Method Participants and Design
Sixty undergraduate students at McMaster University participated for course credit. The experiment was designed as a replication of Experiment 1 using five contingency pairs rather than two, casual scenario as a between factor, and a total of 32 rather than 48 trials with a single overall rating. The 60 participants were randomly assigned to one of the four causal scenarios (i.e., 2C-1E, 1C-2E, 2E-1C, or 1E-2C). Within each group, the presentation order of the five ∆P B values was randomized. Table 2 illustrates the trial frequencies obtained by combining ∆P A = 0.5 with each of the five ∆P B values. 
Procedure and Materials
The procedure and materials in Experiment 2 were very similar to those in Experiment 1. The difference was in the total number trials and the number of ∆P B values. Participants were presented with 32 trials before rating Events A and B, where they would repeat the process after observing each of the five "experiments". Two more fictitious chemicals and one more bacterial strain was added among those to be presented.
Results and Discussion
Mean ratings of Event A are illustrated in Figure 4a . Ratings for each of the four causal scenarios are plotted as a function of the five ∆P B values. According to causal-model theory, ratings of A in the 2C-1E and 1E-2C scenarios should track the pattern of conditional ∆P A values presented in Table 2. The conditional ∆P A values decrease as ∆P B increases, and therefore ratings of A should also decrease. Causalmodel theory also predicts that the ratings of A in the 1C-2E and 2E-1C scenarios should track the pattern of uncon-ditional ∆P A values presented in Table 2 . The unconditional ∆P A values are constant, and therefore the ratings of A should not change across the five ∆P B values. The Rescorla-Wagner model makes similar predictions but for different scenarios: ratings of A should be a decreasing function of ∆P B for the 2C-1E and 2E-1C scenarios, and should be independent of ∆P B for the 1C-2E and 1E-2C scenarios. As we noted earlier, the predictions for both models are ordinal. Thus, we are examining not only the presence or absence of cue-interaction, but also the ordinal level of cue-interaction among the four causal scenarios.
The ratings of A appear to support the predictions made by causal-model theory. In the 2C-1E and 1E-2C scenarios, ratings of A decline as ∆P B increases, tracking the pattern of conditional ∆P A values presented in Table 2 . In the 2E-1C and 1C-2E scenarios, ratings of A remain relatively constant regardless of the contingency for Event B, tracking the pattern of unconditional ∆P A values presented in Table 2 .
With four causal scenarios (2C-1E, 1C-2E, 2E-1C, 1E-2C) as a between factor and five ∆P B values (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) as a within factor, a mixed ANOVA was conducted on the ratings of A. As expected, the analysis revealed main effects of causal scenario, F(3, 56) = 14.83, MSe = 2098.34, and ∆P B , F(4, 224) = 13.32, MSe = 1348.32, as well as a significant interaction between them, F(12, 224) = 3.98, MSe = 1348.32. The Tukey test was used to examine this significant interaction to see whether the results replicated those found in Experiment 1. The ratings of A for the two ∆P B values used in Experiment 1 (∆P B = 0 and ∆P B = 1) were compared and ratings were not significantly different among the four causal scenarios when ∆P B = 0. Also, these ratings did not differ from the ratings when ∆P B = 1 if one cause produced two effects (1C-2E and 2E-1C). In contrast, when two causes produced a single effect (2C-1E and 1E-2C) and ∆P B = 1, ratings were significantly lower than the other ratings and did not differ from each other. Thus, ratings of A in Experiment 2 provide a replication of the Experiment 1 results. Cue-interaction occurs when two causes result in one effect, regardless of whether the causes precede or follow the effect, and cue-interaction does not occur when a single cause results in two effects, regardless of their causal order.
According to causal-model theory, ratings of A should decrease as ∆P B increases when two causes produce one effect (2C-1E and 1E-2C), and should remain constant when one cause produces two effects (1C-2E and 2E-1C). A linear trend analysis was conducted on the A ratings, separately for each scenario, across the five ∆P B values 1 . As predicted by causal-model theory, the linear trend was significant for the 2C-1E, F(1, 56) = 40.10, and 1E-2C, F(1, 56) = 29.60, scenarios, and was not significant for the 1C-2E, F(1, 56) = .09, and 2E-1C, F(1, 56) = .74, scenarios (MSe = 1751.69 for each comparison).
Mean ratings of Event B are illustrated in Figure 4b . The ratings of B clearly increase with ∆P B . Table 2 indicates that for 0.5/0.25, 0.5/0.5, and 0.5/0.75, the conditional values of ∆P B are less than the unconditional values. Thus, according to causal-model theory, ratings of B if two causes produce one effect (2C-1E and 1E-2C) should be less than if one cause produces two effects (1C-2E and 2E-1C). While the data tend in that direction, the statistical analysis indicated that the scenario effect was not significant. With ratings of B as the dependent measure, a mixed ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of ∆P B , F(4, 224) = 107.84, MSe = 1047.12. The main effect of causal scenario was not significant, F(3, 56) = 1.16, MSe = 2296.1, nor was the interaction between causal scenario and ∆P B , F(12, 224) = .89, MSe = 1047.13. To evaluate whether the absence of a significant scenario effect was attributable to the cases where the conditional and unconditional values of ∆P B were the same (0.5/0 and 0.5/1), the ANOVA was conducted on the three other pairings (0.5/0.25, 0.5/0.5, and 0.5/.75). Again, only the main effect of ∆P B was significant, F(2, 112) = 50.51, MSe = 1223.04.
In summary, the ratings of A in Experiment 2 provide a direct replication of the ratings in Experiment 1 and generalize the results to less extreme ∆P B values. When two causes produce one effect, participants rated the moderately positive cause as less predictive when it was paired with a strong predictor than to when it was paired with a weak predictor. When a single cause produced two effects, participants rated the moderately positive effect as equally diagnostic regardless of the diagnosticity of the effect that it was paired with. This interaction between causal order and the number of cues and outcomes is consistent with the predictions of causal-model theory. Although not statistically significant, the ratings of B were also consistent with causal-model theory. It must be emphasized that the B ratings do not provide a strong assessment of the models because the ∆P B values were selected only for their influence on the conditional ∆P A values.
As in Experiment 1, the causal-model effect is not as strong when the effect(s) precede the cause(s). In Experiment 2, we see that ratings of A are consistently lower in the 2E-1C scenario compared to the 1C-2E scenario. Similarly, ratings of A tend to be lower in the 2C-1E scenario compared to the 1E-2C scenario. Again, while the differences are not significant, when the effect(s) precede the cause(s), participants' ratings seem be influenced less by the causal description of the events and more by their associative strength. Although the data from Experiments 1 and 2 provide conclusive evidence that participants' judgments are driven primarily by the structure of the causal relationship, we will demonstrate the significant role of associative processes in the following two experiments.
Experiment 3
A conditional ∆P account applied to causal-model theory allows one to generate dichotomous predictions in which 1 We are interested in whether there is a significant linear trend among the A ratings across the five levels of ∆P B , tracking the conditional ∆P values for Event A. The interval between the levels of the independent variable are unequal (i.e., 0.5, 0.47, 0.33, 0.17, 0) whereby the following coefficients were derived: 21, 17, 4, -13, -29 (see Howell, 1997 , for derivation).
cue-interaction should occur or not (as has been done in previous investigations), but in addition, it allows for ordinal predictions where the relative effectiveness of each event determines the degree to which they interact. The data from Experiments 1 and 2 provide solid evidence for the influence of causal expectation on human inference. In Experiment 3 we demonstrate that these high level processes may not occur independently of basic, low-level (associative) processes by exploring a different measure of causal assessment.
In Experiments 1 and 2, participants passively viewed a series of trials before providing an overall rating of the relationship between the events. Our methodology differs from that reported by others (e.g., Shanks & López, 1996; Price & Yates, 1995; Cobos, López, Caño, Almaraz, & Shanks, 2002; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992) who required participants to predict the outcome of each trial, and were provided corrective feedback on their prediction. For example, on each trial, participants in Experiment 1 of Waldmann and Holyoak (1992) would see descriptions of people on a computer screen and were to use those descriptions to predict whether they thought a person had the described disease (by pressing a Yes key) or did not have the disease (by pressing a No key). After indicating their response, they received Correct or Incorrect as feedback. If participants are presented with four types of event combinations (AB, A∼B, ∼AB, ∼A∼B) and are asked to predict the outcome of each trial (Yes, No), then a 4×2 matrix, like the one presented in Figure 1 , can be constructed where the columns represent the two prediction responses (Yes, No) rather than the actual outcomes. These predictions can then be used as an indirect measure of their conditional ∆P estimates (López, Shanks, Almaraz, & Fernandez, 1998; Tangen & Allan, in press ).
We have shown in Experiments 1 and 2 that participants demonstrate a sensitivity to the structure of causal relationships which is consistent with the predictions made by causal-model theory. To further investigate participants' sensitivity to causal structure, we required participants in Experiment 3 to predict the outcome of each trial in addition to providing an overall rating of the relationship between the events. Thus, we obtained both a measure of causal assessment derived from prediction responses, as well as explicit overall judgments between the events to determine whether the two measures were congruent as we varied the structure of the causal relationship.
Among the four causal scenarios described earlier (2C-1E, 1C-2E, 2E-1C, and 1E-2C), the results from Experiments 1 and 2 reveal that neither causal order or the number of cues and outcomes were significant factors independently. Instead, the important variable was the interaction between the two factors. That is, the structure of the causal relationship. Therefore, to avoid the potential confound of the number of predictions participants were making on each trial, we eliminated the right hand column of Figure 2 and presented them with only two cues and one outcome (2C-1E and 2E-1C). Each group was shown identical stimuli, but the causal description of the stimuli differed between the two groups. According to causal-model theory, judgments should vary depending on whether the events are described as two causes resulting in an effect, or as two effects resulting from one cause. In contrast, the Rescorla-Wagner model does not make a distinction between the causal description of the events, and codes the two scenarios identically as two cues followed by one outcome. On each trial, a participant was presented with one of four event combinations (AB, A∼B, ∼AB, ∼A∼B) and then predicted whether the effect/cause occurred given the information from the preceding pair of events and from previous trials. Corrective feedback (Correct, Incorrect) was provided immediately after making their decision. After 32 trials, they were asked to provide an overall rating of the relationship between the events as in the previous experiments. The same five contingency pairs were used as in Experiment 2.
Method Participants and Design
Thirty undergraduate students at McMaster University took part in this experiment for course credit. The design of Experiment 3 was identical to that used in Experiment 2 except the 1C-2E and 1E-2C causal scenarios were eliminated, and participants were asked to predict the outcome of each trial and were provided feedback on their decision. The frequency of events in Experiment 3 are shown in Table 2 .
Procedure and Materials
The same procedure and materials as Experiment 2 were used with the addition of predictions on each trial. Participants were presented with two cues consisting of the presence or absence of two chemicals (2C or 2E) and were then asked to predict whether they thought the bacterial strain survived/was added or not by clicking one of two buttons on the computer screen. Once they made their selection, they were presented with the outcome (1E or 1C) along with Correct or Incorrect as feedback. The prediction responses for each event combination were recorded and used to calculate estimated conditional ∆P values by counting the number of Yes and No responses for each event combination (AB, A∼B, ∼AB, ∼A∼B) after 16, 32, 48, and 64 trials and substituting these frequencies into Equations 3 -6.
Results
In this experiment there were two dependent measures, ratings and predictions.
Ratings.
Figures 5a and 5b depict the mean ratings for Cues A and B respectively. The pattern of results for both cues is similar to that observed in Experiment 2. Ratings of A, in the 2C-1E scenario, decline as ∆P B increases, tracking the pattern of conditional ∆P A values presented in Table 2 . Ratings of A, in the 2E-1C scenario, remain relatively constant as ∆P B increases, tracking the pattern of unconditional ∆P A values presented in Table 2 
Discussion
The results from Experiment 3 provide a direct replication of the rating data obtained in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants rated identical contingencies quite differently depending on whether the events had been described as causes or effects. In the 2C-1E scenario, participants gave lower ratings to the moderately predictive Cause A when it was paired with a highly predictive Cause B than when it was paired with a less predictive Cause B, indicating that causes interact. In contrast, in the 2E-1C scenario, the ratings of Effect A did not depend on the contingency of Effect B, indicating that effects do not interact.
In contrast to the ratings, a causal scenario effect was not seen with the prediction responses. For both 2C-1E and 2E-1C, the estimated conditional ∆P values for A decreased as unconditional ∆P B increased, indicating that cueinteraction occurred in both scenarios. There appears to be a dissociation between the ratings and the prediction responses. Table 2 shows that for each cue, the two conditional ∆P values were always the same. That is, ∆P A|B = ∆P A|∼B and ∆P B|A = ∆P B|∼A . This was not the case, however, for the estimates based on the participants predictions, where est∆P A|B < est∆P A|∼B and est∆P B|A < est∆P B|∼A . That is, the estimated conditional ∆P value was smaller when the cue conditionalized upon was present than when it was absent. This pattern of results was also found by Tangen and Allan (in press ).
In summary, identical stimuli were presented to participants that were described either as two causes of an effect (2C-1E) or as two effects of a cause (2E-1C). Participants' overall judgments of these relationships varied systematically depending on their causal labels. In addition to mak- Figure 6a , est∆P A|∼B is shown in Figure 6b , est∆P B|A is shown in Figure 6c , and est∆P B|∼A is shown in Figure 6d . Error-bars represent standard errors of the means.
ing an overall judgment of the relationship, they were asked to make a prediction as to the whether the outcome would occur or not on each trial. Their prediction responses did not vary according to the causal description of the events. We have revealed a dissociation between two means of assessing judgments of causality. Trial-by-trial prediction responses require participants to estimate the presence or absence of the outcome. The results suggest that participants manage this task by simply basing their judgment on the current level of associative strength, identifying cues as generic events without any deeper recognition of their causal status. Overall ratings, on the other hand, require participants to not only consider the status of a single outcome, but also take into account the causal relationship among the events presented.
Thus, it seems that participants can report either the current level of associative strength in their predictions by basing their causal assessments on the number of cues and outcomes rather than on the causal structure of the events; or their assessments can reflect the causal status of the events by considering how they are structured. It depends on the nature of the question being asked.
Experiment 4
The results from Experiment 3 reveal that participants were sensitive to the causal description of the cues and outcome in rating the overall relationship, but the effect was absent in their trial-by-trial predictions. Experiment 4 was designed to further investigate this dissociation between ratings and prediction responses by increasing the total number of trials in each condition from 32 to 64, and having participants provide an overall rating after 16, 32, 48, and 64 trials. By increasing the number of ratings, we can compare each measure across trials as a function of causal scenario. Perhaps a greater number of trials would result in a greater sensitivity to the associative processes at work and less sensitivity to the causal description of the events. Increasing the total number of trials resulted in the elimination of the 0.5/0.5 contingency pair to maintain a one-hour experimental session.
Method Participants and Design
Forty undergraduate students at McMaster University took part in this experiment for course credit. The design of Experiment 4 was similar to Experiment 3, but the total number of trials was increased to 64, participants were asked to rate each cue after 16, 32, 48, and 64 trials, and the 0.5/0.5 contingency pair was eliminated. The event frequencies in Experiment 4 are shown in Table 3 .
Procedure and Materials
The procedure and materials for Experiment 4 were similar to those used in Experiment 3 apart from the total number of trials presented and the number of ratings provided by participants. Four contingency pairs were presented to participants as separate "experiments".
Results
As in Experiment 3, there were two dependent measures, ratings and predictions. 
Ratings.
Figures 7a and 7b depict the mean ratings after 64 trials for Cues A and B respectively, and Table 4 depicts the mean and standard error of the ratings for Cue A after 32, 48, and 64 trials. The ratings and estimated ∆P values after 16 trials are not reported as participants' prediction responses of the randomly presented events occasionally resulted in 4×2 matrices with row frequencies of zero. The pattern of results after 32 trials is similar to that of Experiments 1, 2, and 3. In the 2C-1E scenario, ratings of A roughly approximate the conditional ∆P values presented in Table 3 , whereas in the 2E-1C scenario the ratings are consistent with the unconditional ∆P values. After 48 and 64 trials, however, a different pattern of results emerges. As illustrated in Figure 7a , ratings of A decline as ∆P B increases, regardless of the causal scenario. The effect of the causal-model seems to have dissipated over trials, and cue-interaction occurs for both scenarios. A 2 (scenario: 2C-1E, 2E-1C) × 4 (∆P B : 0, 0.25, 0.75, 1) × 3 (trial: 32, 48, 64) mixed ANOVA on the ratings of A revealed only a significant main effect for ∆P B , F(3, 114) = 21.27, MSe = 3189.24, which contributed to significant interactions with scenario, F(3, 114) = 3.33, MSe = 3189.24, trial, F(6, 228) = 2.60, MSe = 1397.89, and a three-way interaction with trial and scenario, F(6, 228) = 3.13, MSe = 1397.89. A linear trend analysis 2 was conducted on the A ratings, separately for each scenario after 32, 48, and 64 trials. For the 2C-1E scenario, the linear trend was significant after 32 trials, F(1, 38) = 13.59, MSe = 2715 .31, 48 trials, F(1, 38) = 19.22, MSe = 2703 .87, and 64 trials, F(1, 38) = 37.95, MSe = 2482 . For the 2E-1C scenario, the linear trend was not significant after 32 trials, F(1, 38) = 2.87, MSe = 2715.31, but was significant after 48 trials, F(1, 38) = 11.05, MSe = 2703.87, and 64 trials, F(1, 38) = 4.70, MSe = 2482.45. Thus, by 48 trials, cue-interaction is seen in both scenarios. Figure 7b presents the mean and standard error of the ratings for Cue B after 64 trials, and Table 5 The only other significant effect was a threeway interaction between ∆P B , trial, and scenario, F(6, 228) = 3.55, MSe = 747.98, resulting primarily from an exceptionally low mean rating in the 2C-1E scenario, 0.5/0.25 condition, after 64 trials.
Predictions.
Figures 8a and 8b plot the estimated ∆P values for Cue A conditional on the presence and absence of B respectively computed after 64 trials. Tables 4 and 5 The mean estimated conditional ∆P values for A calculated after 32, 48 and 64 trials closely track the conditional ∆P values presented in Table 3 for both causal scenarios. Also, the estimated ∆P values conditional on the presence of B (est∆P A|B ) are lower than the estimated ∆P values conditional on the absence of B (est∆P A|∼B ).
A 2 (scenario: 2C-1E, 2E-1C) × 4 (∆P B : 0, 0.25, 0.75, 1) × 3 (trial: 32, 48, 64) × 2 (Cue B status: present, absent) mixed ANOVA on the estimated values for A verifies these observations. The ∆P B main effect was significant, F(3, 114) = 33.71, MSe = .21, and contributed to a significant interaction with trial, F(6, 228) = 9.39, MSe = .01. The status of Cue B main effect was also significant, F(1, 38) = 19.57, MSe = .14, indicating that estimated conditional ∆P for A was lower when B was present (.28) than when it was absent (.38), and the significant Cue B status × trial interaction, F(2, 76) = 5.76, MSe = .14, indicates that this difference became less evident across trials. A linear trend analysis was conducted separately for the 2C-1E and 2E-1C causal scenarios after 32, 48, and 64 trials, both on the estimated ∆P values conditional on the presence and absence of B. These analyses reveal a significant linear trend for the prediction responses in both causal scenarios, after each of the three trial intervals (32, 48, 64) , regardless of the status of Cue B. Cueinteraction is evident in the prediction responses regardless of the circumstances.
Figures 6c and 6d illustrate the estimated ∆P values for B conditional on the presence and absence of A respectively computed after 64 trials. An identical ANOVA was performed on the prediction response data for B, substituting Cue A status: (present, absent) for Cue B status. Resembling the data reported in Experiment 3, significant main effects were obtained for ∆P B , F(3, 114) = 110.28, MSe = .22, and Cue A status, F(1, 38) = 19.57, MSe = .15. In addition, the trial factor introduced in Experiment 4 was significant, F(2, 76) = 9.66, MSe = .02, and led to significant interactions with ∆P B , F(6, 228) = 6.93, MSe = .01, and Cue A status, F(2, 76) = 5.76, MSe = .02. As indicated by the Cue A data, the estimated conditional ∆P values for B were lower when A was present (.36) than when it was absent (.46), and this difference became less evident across trials.
Discussion
The rating data from Experiment 4 are similar to those obtained in each of the previous experiments, and have extended these findings to reveal an interesting scenario × trial interaction. Experiment 4 has shown that cue-interaction is evident across the entire span of 64 trials when A and B are Other data collected in our lab suggest that the trial by scenario interaction is indeed robust (Sadeghi, 2003) . The prediction response values are estimated by separately calculating ∆P conditional on the presence and absence of the other cue. In both Experiment 3 and 4, estimated ∆P conditional on the present cue was significantly lower than estimated ∆P conditional on the absent cue, i.e., est∆P A|B < est∆P A|∼B and est∆P B|A < est∆P B|∼A . Although the conditional ∆P account has not explicitly addressed the relationship between estimated conditional ∆P and actual ∆P, one would expect them to be congruent as indicated by the identical conditional ∆P values presented in Table 3 . Our data indicating that the estimated values are not congruent with the actual values might be problematic for the conditional ∆P account (see also Tangen & Allan, in press ).
In summary, Experiment 4 provides similar results as Experiments 1-3. Overall ratings were influenced by the causal description of the events after 32 trials. Trial-by-trial prediction responses, however, were not influenced by the causal description of the events. In addition, Experiment 4 demonstrates that on later trials, participants become less sensitive to the difference in description of the two causal scenarios. These data support the argument that causal assessments are not driven solely by associative or causal-model processes, but instead seem be sensitive to both depending on how and when they are obtained. After repeatedly making trial-bytrial predictions, participants may be disregarding the causal order of the events which may be reflected in their overall causal ratings. By continually predicting the presence or absence of the outcome, it is likely that participants are treating the events less like causes and effects, and more like cues and outcomes. As a consequence, on later trials, their causal assessments are based on the same associative strength as their trial-by-trial predictions are based on.
General Discussion Price and Yates (1995) were among the first to suggest that both high and low-level processes are used in causal assessments (see also Hagmayer & Waldmann, 2000 , for a similar two-process position). There has been little work since then to explain the conditions under which these two processes are likely to be operating. Instead, there has been considerable Figure 8a , est∆P A|∼B is shown in Figure 8b , est∆P B|A is shown in Figure 8c , and est∆P B|∼A is shown in Figure 8d .
debate between causal-model and associative learning theorists as to which of the two theoretical interpretations is correct. The results from our experiments revisit the arguments made by Price and Yates (1995) as to the joint contribution of associative and causal factors in judgments of causality. A similar approach has been taken recently by Collins and Shanks (2002) to account for primacy and recency effects. They describe two strategies involved in judgments of causality: the momentary strategy where judgments simply reflect the current associative strength of the cue, and the integrative strategy where participants do not constrain their judgments on the current perception of the relationship, but instead integrate information across a number of trials. Although Collins and Shanks were describing judgment strategies in primacy and recency effects, we believe the same tactics are being used in judgments of causally asymmetric events. Participants are required to estimate the presence or absence of the outcome in their trial-by-trial prediction responses. They likely manage this task by identifying cues as generic events without any deeper recognition of their causal status, thereby basing their judgment on the current level of associative strength. Overall ratings, on the other hand, require a more global (integrative) strategy where participants not only consider the status of a single outcome, but also take into account the causal structure of the events presented.
We have demonstrated that the contribution of causal and associative processes depends on what the participant is being asked about the events, and on their experience with those events. Participants recognize that in order to assess the influence of a given cause, they must hold constant (conditionalize on) any alternative causes (2C-1E). Conversely, they understand that a single cause can independently influence a number of effects (1C-2E). In associative terms, two cues compete to be associated with a single outcome. Conversely, one cue can be associated with a number of outcomes. These results are not surprising to anyone. In fact, both causalmodel theory and the Rescorla-Wagner model make these predictions. The question, then, is whether the events continue to interact or not when the order of the causal labels are reversed (2E-1C and 1E-2C respectively). The RescorlaWagner model predicts that the events should be treated identically in either instance, and causal-model theory predicts that the presence of a cue-interaction effect should reverse along with the causal labels.
Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that contingency ratings are influenced by the interaction between causal order (CE vs. EC) and the number of cues and outcomes (2-1 vs. 1-2) indicating that participants are sensitive to the structure of the causal relationship. In Experiment 3, we see that predictions, a second measure of causal assessment, are not so easily swayed by the causal structure of the stimuli. Even though participants assess the same causal relationship in either case, they account for the causal description of the events in one instance (i.e., ratings), but not the other (i.e., predictions). Finally, in Experiment 4, we see that the relative weighting of causal and associative factors are not only influenced by the means of assessing causal inference (ratings and predictions), but also by the repeated exposure to the events. We cannot argue whether the repeated exposure to trial-by-trial predictions is influencing their causal judgments, or whether it is simply the result of additional trials, as these two factors were not tested independently. Regardless, most experiments that support an associative account use both a large number of trials and trial-by-trial predictions which may explain the discrepant results. The relative contribution of each of these factors remains an open question.
We would expect that if participants were asked to describe how the causal events were interconnected, or were required to use the causal model for some particular purpose, then they would likely be more sensitive to the structure of the causal relationship then if they were asked to report the probability, covariation, or frequency of the events. Similarly, we might expect participants to consider the causal nature of the events more carefully if several types of causal relationships were presented rather than repeatedly presenting just one. As indicated by the results from Experiment 4, participants become less sensitive to the influence of the causal-model in both their ratings and predictions as trials progress. One might expect that participants would disregard the causal order of the events if they were presented with a large number of trials. In fact, several experiments supporting an associative interpretation have shown just that. For example, Cobos et al. (2002) required participants to provide a single rating of each event after a learning phase that consisted of as many as 240 trials. Our data from Experiment 4 indicate that any causal-model effect would be largely eliminated by then. While there is no reason to expect the effect of the causal-model to diminish over trials, it may be a step forward in understanding the circumstances with which we use them. We suggest that the number of trials presented to the participant is an important factor in determining their sensitivity to the structure of the causal relationship. In fact, many experiments that have provided support for causal-model theory have used a smaller number of trials (e.g., Waldmann, 2000 Waldmann, , 2001 compared to those supporting an associative account (e.g., Shanks & López, 1996; Cobos et al., 2002) . This finding may help explain much of the contradictory data in the literature.
Over the past decade, associative and causal-model theorists have continued to debate whether or not human inferences are guided by causal interpretation. We have described specific circumstances that allow one to find one pattern of results or the other, and we provide evidence for an account in which the two processes operate in conjunction rather than independently.
